Is a Decentralized Right-to-Work Policy Feasible? / Martin Ravallion.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Ravallion, Martin.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w25687.

NBER working paper series no. w25687

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2019.

Summary:

Evidence on the implementation of India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act suggests that the available work is often rationed by local leaders in poor areas, and that this is an important factor limiting the scheme's impact on poverty. The paper offers explanations for this empirical finding, with likely relevance to other decentralized, rights-based, programs. It is shown that rationing of work opportunities can arise under decentralized implementation in poor places even when the center wants to honor the employment guarantee. Two main drivers of such rationing are identified: local administrative costs and local corruption. Administrative reforms by the center can have perverse effects. Policy implications are drawn for how to better assure that the stipulated rights are attained in practice.

Notes:

Print version record

March 2019.