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A Structural Model of Electoral Accountability / S. Borağan Aruoba, Allan Drazen, Razvan Vlaicu.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Aruoba, S. Borağan.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w21151.
- NBER working paper series no. w21151
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2015.
- Summary:
- This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors for 1982-2012. We find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort. We also find a selection effect, although it is weaker in terms of its effect on average governor performance. According to our model, the widely-used two-term regime improves voter welfare by 4.2% compared to a one-term regime, and find that a three-term regime may improve voter welfare even further.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- May 2015.
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