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Grading on a Curve, and other Effects of Group Size on All-Pay Auctions / James Andreoni, Andy Brownback.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Andreoni, James.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w20184.
- NBER working paper series no. w20184
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2014.
- Summary:
- We model contests with a fixed proportion of prizes, such as a grading curve, as all-pay auctions where higher effort weakly increases the likelihood of a prize. We find theoretical predictions for the effect of contest size on effort and test our predictions in a laboratory experiment that compares two-bidder auctions with one prize and 20-bidder auctions with ten prizes. Our results demonstrate that larger contests elicit lower effort by low-skilled students, but higher effort by high-skilled. Large contests also generate more accurate rankings of students and more accurate assignment of high grades to the high-skilled.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- May 2014.
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