Motivating Effort In Contributing to Public Goods Inside Organizations: Field Experimental Evidence / Andrea Blasco, Olivia S. Jung, Karim R. Lakhani, Michael Menietti.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Blasco, Andrea.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Jung, Olivia S.

Lakhani, Karim R.

Menietti, Michael.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w22189.

NBER working paper series no. w22189

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Motivating Effort In Contributing to Public Goods Inside Organizations

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.

Summary:

We investigate the factors driving workers' decisions to generate public goods inside an organization through a randomized solicitation of workplace improvement proposals in a medical center with 1200 employees. We find that pecuniary incentives, such as winning a prize, generate a threefold increase in participation compared to non-pecuniary incentives alone, such as prestige or recognition. Participation is also increased by a solicitation appealing to improving the workplace. However, emphasizing the patient mission of the organization led to countervailing effects on participation. Overall, these results are consistent with workers having multiple underlying motivations to contribute to public goods inside the organization consisting of a combination of pecuniary and altruistic incentives associated with the mission of the organization.

Notes:

Print version record

April 2016.