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Innovation and the Financial Guillotine / Ramana Nanda, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Nanda, Ramana.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19379.
- NBER working paper series no. w19379
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013.
- Summary:
- Our paper demonstrates that while failure tolerance by investors may encourage potential entrepreneurs to innovate, financiers with investment strategies that tolerate early failure endogenously choose to fund less radical innovations. Failure tolerance as an equilibrium price that increases in the level of experimentation. More experimental projects that don't generate enough to pay the price cannot be started. In equilibrium all competing financiers may choose to offer failure tolerant contracts to attract entrepreneurs, leaving no capital to fund the most radical, experimental projects. The tradeoff between failure tolerance and a sharp guillotine helps explain when and where radical innovation occurs.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- August 2013.
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