Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications / Matthias Doepke, Fabian Kindermann.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Doepke, Matthias.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Kindermann, Fabian.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w22072.

NBER working paper series no. w22072

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Bargaining over Babies

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.

Summary:

It takes a woman and a man to make a baby. This fact suggests that for a birth to take place, the parents should first agree on wanting a child. Using newly available data on fertility preferences and outcomes, we show that indeed, babies are likely to arrive only if both parents desire one. In addition, there are many couples who disagree on having babies, and in low-fertility countries women are much more likely than men to be opposed to having another child. We account for this evidence with a quantitative model of household bargaining in which the distribution of the burden of child care between mothers and fathers is a key determinant of fertility. The model implies that fertility is highly responsive to targeted policies that lower the child care burden specifically for mothers.

Notes:

Print version record

March 2016.