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Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching / Alex Rees-Jones, Ran Shorrer, Chloe J. Tergiman.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Rees-Jones, Alex.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w26734.
- NBER working paper series no. w26734
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020.
- Summary:
- We present results from experiments containing incentivized school-choice scenarios. In these scenarios, we vary whether schools' assessments of students are based on a common priority (inducing correlation in admissions decisions) or are based on independent assessments (eliminating correlation in admissions decisions). The quality of students' application strategies declines in the presence of correlated admissions: application strategies become substantially more aggressive and fail to include attractive "safety" options. We provide a battery of tests suggesting that this phenomenon is at least partially driven by correlation neglect, and we discuss implications for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- February 2020.
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