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Regulating Bidder Participation in Auctions / Vivek Bhattacharya, James W. Roberts, Andrew Sweeting.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Bhattacharya, Vivek.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19352.
- NBER working paper series no. w19352
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013.
- Summary:
- Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first-price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends non-monotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first-price auctions with free entry for bridge-building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- August 2013.
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