Public Information is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections / Abhijit Banerjee, Nils T. Enevoldsen, Rohini Pande, Michael Walton.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Banerjee, Abhijit.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Enevoldsen, Nils T.

Pande, Rohini.

Walton, Michael.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w26925.

NBER working paper series no. w26925

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Public Information is an Incentive for Politicians

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020.

Summary:

In 2010, we informed a random set of Delhi councilors, some ineligible for re-election in their current ward, that a newspaper would report on their performance shortly prior to the 2012 city elections. Using slum dwellers' spending preferences, we created a councilor-specific index of pro-poor spending. Treated councilors increased pro-poor spending in high-slum wards. Cross-cutting experiments suggest that the public nature of report cards, not access to information on public services per se, incentivized councilors. Data on party ticket allocation and electoral outcomes shows that, in low-information situations, credible public disclosures of politician achievements matters to both parties and voters.

Notes:

Print version record

April 2020.