Promotions and the Peter Principle / Alan Benson, Danielle Li, Kelly Shue.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Benson, Alan.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Li, Danielle.

Shue, Kelly.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w24343.

NBER working paper series no. w24343

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2018.

Summary:

The best worker is not always the best candidate for manager. In these cases, do firms promote the best potential manager or the best worker in her current job? Using microdata on the performance of sales workers at 214 firms, we find evidence consistent with the "Peter Principle," which predicts that firms prioritize current job performance in promotion decisions at the expense of other observable characteristics that better predict managerial performance. We estimate that the costs of promoting workers with lower managerial potential are high, suggesting either that firms are making inefficient promotion decisions or that the benefits of promotion-based incentives are great enough to justify the costs of managerial mismatch.

Notes:

Print version record

February 2018.