Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception / Judd B. Kessler, Corinne Low, Colin Sullivan.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kessler, Judd B.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Low, Corinne.

Sullivan, Colin.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w25800.

NBER working paper series no. w25800

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Incentivized Resume Rating

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2019.

Summary:

We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called Incentivized Resume Rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.

Notes:

Print version record

May 2019.