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An Econometric Evaluation of Competing Explanations for The Midterm Gap / Brian G. Knight.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Knight, Brian G.
Contributor:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w20311.
NBER working paper series no. w20311
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2014.
Summary:
This paper provides a unified theoretical and empirical analysis of three longstanding explanations for the consistent loss of support for the President's party in midterm Congressional elections: (1) a Presidential penalty, defined as a preference for supporting the opposition during midterm years, (2) a surge and decline in voter turnout, and (3) a reversion to the mean in voter ideology. To quantify the contribution of each of these factors, we build an econometric model in which voters jointly choose whether or not to participate and which party to support in both House and Presidential elections. Estimated using ANES data from both Presidential and midterm years, the model can fully explain the observed midterm gaps, and counterfactual simulations demonstrate that each factor makes a sizable contribution towards the midterm gap, with the Presidential penalty playing the largest role.
Notes:
Print version record
July 2014.

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