Complex Disclosure / Ginger Zhe Jin, Michael Luca, Daniel J. Martin.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Jin, Ginger Zhe.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Luca, Michael.

Martin, Daniel J.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w24675.

NBER working paper series no. w24675

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2018.

Summary:

We present evidence that unnecessarily complex disclosure can result from strategic incentives to shroud information. In our lab experiment, senders are required to report their private information truthfully, but can choose how complex to make their reports. We find that senders use complex disclosure over half the time. This obfuscation is profitable because receivers make systematic mistakes in assessing complex reports. Regression and structural analysis suggest that these mistakes could be driven by receivers who are naive about the strategic use of complexity or overconfident about their ability to process complex information.

Notes:

Print version record

June 2018.