Compensation Matters: Incentives for Multitasking in a Law Firm / Ann Bartel, Brianna Cardiff-Hicks, Kathryn Shaw.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Bartel, Ann.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Cardiff-Hicks, Brianna.

Shaw, Kathryn.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19412.

NBER working paper series no. w19412

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Compensation Matters

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013.

Summary:

Due to the limited availability of firm-level compensation data, there is little empirical evidence on the impact of compensation plans on personal productivity. We study an international law firm that moves from high-powered individual incentives towards incentives for "leadership" activities that contribute to the firm's long run profitability. The effect of this change on the task allocation of the firm's team leaders is large and robust; team leaders increase their non-billable hours and shift billable hours to team members. Although the motivation for the change in the compensation plan was the multitasking problem, this change also impacted the way tasks were allocated within each team, resulting in greater teamwork.

Notes:

Print version record

September 2013.