1 option
Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework / Jonathan Heathcote, Kjetil Storesletten, Giovanni L. Violante.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Heathcote, Jonathan.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19899.
- NBER working paper series no. w19899
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Other Title:
- Optimal Tax Progressivity
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2014.
- Summary:
- What shapes the optimal degree of progressivity of the tax and transfer system? On the one hand, a progressive tax system can counteract inequality in initial conditions and substitute for imperfect private insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk. At the same time, progressivity reduces incentives to work and to invest in skills, and aggravates the externality associated with valued public expenditures. We develop a tractable equilibrium model that features all of these trade-offs. The analytical expressions we derive for social welfare deliver a transparent understanding of how preferences, technology, and market structure parameters influence the optimal degree of progressivity. A calibration for the U.S. economy indicates that endogenous skill investment, flexible labor supply, and the externality linked to valued government purchases play quantitatively similar roles in limiting desired progressivity.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- February 2014.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.