Optimal Tax Administration / Michael Keen, Joel Slemrod.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Keen, Michael.

Contributor:

Slemrod, Joel.

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w22408.

NBER working paper series no. w22408

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.

Summary:

This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. At its heart is a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions--the "enforcement elasticity of tax revenue"--that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Amongst the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap.

Notes:

Print version record

July 2016.