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The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies / Markus K. Brunnermeier, Luis Garicano, Philip Lane, Marco Pagano, Ricardo Reis, Tano Santos, David Thesmar, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Dimitri Vayanos.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Brunnermeier, Markus K.
Contributor:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Garicano, Luis.
Lane, Philip.
Pagano, Marco.
Reis, Ricardo.
Santos, Tano.
Thesmar, David.
Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn.
Vayanos, Dimitri.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w21993.
NBER working paper series no. w21993
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.
Summary:
We propose a simple model of the sovereign-bank diabolic loop, and establish four results. First, the diabolic loop can be avoided by restricting banks domestic sovereign exposures relative to their equity. Second, equity requirements can be lowered if banks only hold senior domestic sovereign debt. Third, such requirements shrink even further if banks only hold the senior tranche of an internationally diversified sovereign portfolio known as ESBies in the euro-area context. Finally, ESBies generate more safe assets than domestic debt tranching alone; and, insofar as the diabolic loop is defused, the junior tranche generated by the securitization is itself risk-free.
Notes:
Print version record
February 2016.

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