Political Activism and the Provision of Dynamic Incentives / Antoine Camous, Russell Cooper.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Camous, Antoine.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Cooper, Russell.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w26654.

NBER working paper series no. w26654

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020.

Summary:

This paper studies the determination of income taxes in a dynamic setting with human capital accumulation. The goal is to understand the factors that support an outcome without complete redistribution, given a majority of relatively poor agents. In the analysis, the internal dynamics of income are not sufficient to prevent complete redistribution under majority rule without commitment. However, a political influence game limits the support for expropriatory taxation and preserves incentives. In some cases, the outcome of the game corresponds with the optimal allocation under commitment.

Notes:

Print version record

January 2020.