Optimal Multistage Adjudication / Louis Kaplow.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kaplow, Louis.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w23364.

NBER working paper series no. w23364

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2017.

Summary:

In many settings, there are preliminary or interim decision points at which legal cases may be terminated: e.g., motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in U.S. civil litigation, grand jury decisions in criminal cases, and agencies' screening and other exercises of discretion in pursuing investigations. This article analyzes how the decision whether to continue versus terminate should optimally be made when (A) proceeding to the next stage generates further information but at a cost to both the defendant and the government and (B) the prospect of going forward, and ultimately imposing sanctions, deters harmful acts and also chills desirable behavior. This subject involves a mechanism design analogue to the standard value of information problem, one that proves to be qualitatively different and notably more complex. Numerous factors enter into the optimal decision rule - some expected, some subtle, and some counterintuitive. The optimal rule for initial or intermediate stages is also qualitatively different from that for assigning liability at the final stage of adjudication.

Notes:

Print version record

April 2017.