Loose Knots: Strong versus Weak Commitments to Save for Education in Uganda / Dean Karlan, Leigh L. Linden.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Karlan, Dean.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Linden, Leigh L.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19863.

NBER working paper series no. w19863

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Loose Knots

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2014.

Summary:

Commitment devices offer an opportunity to restrict future choices. However, strict commitments may deter participation. Using a school-based commitment savings program for children to save for educational expenses in Uganda, we compare an account fully-committed to school expenses to an account with a weaker commitment (funds withdrawn in cash, rather than a voucher). Children save more in the weaker commitment treatment arm, and when combined with parental outreach spend more on educational supplies and score 0.11 standard deviations higher on math and language test scores. The fully-committed account yields no such educational improvements, and neither account finds impacts on secondary or downstream outcomes such as attendance, enrollment, or non-cognitive skills.

Notes:

Print version record

January 2014.