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An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-up / Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber, Ross Levine.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Galetovic, Alexander.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w21090.
- NBER working paper series no. w21090
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2015.
- Summary:
- A large literature asserts that standard essential patents (SEPs) allow their owners to "hold up" innovation by charging fees that exceed their incremental contribution to a final product. We evaluate two central, interrelated predictions of this SEP hold-up hypothesis: (1) SEP-reliant industries should experience more stagnant quality-adjusted prices than similar non-SEP-reliant industries; and (2) court decisions that reduce the excessive power of SEP holders should accelerate innovation in SEP-reliant industries. We find no empirical support for either prediction. Indeed, SEP-reliant industries have the fastest quality-adjusted price declines in the U.S. economy.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- April 2015.
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