1 option
Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense / Amanda Agan, Matthew Freedman, Emily Owens.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Agan, Amanda.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w24579.
- NBER working paper series no. w24579
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2018.
- Summary:
- Governments in the U.S. must offer free legal services to low-income people accused of crimes. These services are frequently provided by assigned counsel, who handle cases for indigent defendants on a contract basis. Court-assigned attorneys generally garner worse case outcomes than privately retained attorneys. Using detailed court records from one large jurisdiction in Texas, we find that the disparities in outcomes are primarily attributable to case characteristics and within-attorney differences across cases in which they are assigned versus retained. The selection of low-quality lawyers into assigned counsel and endogenous matching in the private market contribute less to the disparities.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- May 2018.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.