E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India / Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Clement Imbert, Santhosh Mathew, Rohini Pande.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Banerjee, Abhijit.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Duflo, Esther.

Imbert, Clement.

Mathew, Santhosh.

Pande, Rohini.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w22803.

NBER working paper series no. w22803

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.

Summary:

In collaboration with the Government of Bihar, India, we conducted a large-scale experiment to evaluate whether transparency in fiscal transfer systems can increase accountability and reduce corruption in the implementation of a workfare program. The reforms introduced electronic fund-flow, cut out administrative tiers, and switched the basis of transfer amounts from forecasts to documented expenditures. Treatment reduced leakages along three measures: expenditures and hours claimed dropped while an independent household survey found no impact on actual employment and wages received; a matching exercise reveals a reduction in fake households on payrolls; and local program officials' self-reported median personal assets fell.

Notes:

Print version record

November 2016.