My Account Log in

1 option

Match or Mismatch? Automatic Admissions and College Preferences of Low- and High-Income Students / Jane Arnold Lincove, Kalena E. Cortes.

NBER Working papers Available online

View online
Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Arnold Lincove, Jane.
Contributor:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cortes, Kalena E.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w22559.
NBER working paper series no. w22559
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.
Summary:
We examine the role of information in the college matching behavior of low- and high-income students, exploiting a state automatic admissions policy that provides some students with perfect a priori certainty of college admissions. We find that admissions certainty encourages college-ready low-income students to seek more rigorous universities. Low-income students who are less college-ready are not influenced by admissions certainty and are sensitive to college entrance exams scores. Most students also prefer campuses with students of similar race, income, and high school class rank, but only highly-qualified low-income students choose institutions where they have fewer same-race and same-income peers.
Notes:
Print version record
August 2016.

The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.

Find

Home Release notes

My Account

Shelf Request an item Bookmarks Fines and fees Settings

Guides

Using the Find catalog Using Articles+ Using your account