Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment / A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Polinsky, A. Mitchell.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Shavell, Steven.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w26083.

NBER working paper series no. w26083

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2019.

Summary:

The prison time actually served by a convicted criminal depends to a significant degree on decisions made by the state during the course of imprisonment--notably, on whether to grant parole. We study a model of the adjustment of sentences assuming that the state's objective is the optimal deterrence of crime. In the model, the state can lower or raise a criminal's initial sentence on the basis of deterrence-relevant information obtained during imprisonment. Our focus on sentence adjustment as a means of promoting deterrence stands in contrast to the usual emphasis in sentence adjustment policy on avoiding recidivism.

Notes:

Print version record

July 2019.