Malpractice Reform and the Sorting of New Physicians by Medical Human Capital / Pinka Chatterji, Siyang Li, Gerald R. Marschke.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Chatterji, Pinka.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Li, Siyang.

Marschke, Gerald R.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w24401.

NBER working paper series no. w24401

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2018.

Summary:

We test whether state malpractice reforms differentially attract physicians whose human capital attributes may predispose them towards higher-than-average malpractice risk and lower quality patient care. Using an exit survey of physicians completing residencies between 1998 and 2017, we estimate willingness-to-pay to locate their first practice in a malpractice-reformed state. We find physicians are willing to forego on average about $11 in hourly wages to locate in a reform state. Training in a high vs. low-risk specialty, graduating from a less vs. more selective medical school, and training at a low vs. higher-ranked teaching hospital increases willingness-to-pay to locate in a reform state by $18 to $24 per hour. We argue that the generally strong human capital-bias in physician sorting responses to litigation reform may play a role in the geographic variation in patient care documented in the health literature.

Notes:

Print version record

March 2018.