Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program / Lorenzo Casaburi, Ugo Troiano.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Casaburi, Lorenzo.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Troiano, Ugo.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w21185.

NBER working paper series no. w21185

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Ghost-House Busters

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2015.

Summary:

The incentives of political agents to enforce tax collection are key determinants of the levels of compliance. We study the electoral response to the Ghost Buildings program, a nationwide anti-tax evasion policy in Italy that used innovative monitoring technologies to target buildings hidden from tax authorities. The program induced monetary and non-monetary benefits for non-evaders. A one standard deviation increase in town-level program intensity leads to a 4.8 percent increase in local incumbent reelection rates. In addition, these political returns are higher in areas with lower tax evasion tolerance and with higher efficiency of public good provision, implying complementarity among enforcement policies, the underlying tax culture, and the quality of the government.

Notes:

Print version record

May 2015.