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Patient Versus Provider Incentives in Long Term Care / Martin B. Hackmann, R. Vincent Pohl, Nicolas R. Ziebarth.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Hackmann, Martin B.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w25178.
- NBER working paper series no. w25178
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2018.
- Summary:
- How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost-sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- October 2018.
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