How Do Employers Use Compensation History?: Evidence From a Field Experiment / Moshe A. Barach, John J. Horton.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Barach, Moshe A.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Horton, John J.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w26627.

NBER working paper series no. w26627

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

How Do Employers Use Compensation History?

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020.

Summary:

We report the results of a field experiment in which treated employers could not observe the compensation history of their job applicants. Treated employers responded by evaluating more applicants, and evaluating those applicants more intensively. They also responded by changing what kind of workers they evaluated: treated employers evaluated workers with 5% lower past average wages and hired workers with 13% lower past average wages. Conditional upon bargaining, workers hired by treated employers struck better wage bargains for themselves.

Notes:

Print version record

January 2020.