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Judicial Checks and Balances / Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Cristian Pop-Eleches, Andrei Shleifer.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
LaPorta, Rafael.
Contributor:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lopez-de-Silane, Florencio.
Pop-Eleches, Cristian.
Shleifer, Andrei.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w9775.
NBER working paper series no. w9775
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2003.
Summary:
In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek (1960) distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom.
Notes:
Print version record
June 2003.

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