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Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem / Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Richard T. Holden.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Aghion, Philippe.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w15167.
- NBER working paper series no. w15167
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009.
- Summary:
- The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- July 2009.
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