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Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes / Alessandra Casella, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Thomas R. Palfrey.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Casella, Alessandra.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w16315.
- NBER working paper series no. w16315
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2010.
- Summary:
- We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, identify weak sufficient conditions for existence, and construct one such equilibrium. We show that this equilibrium must always result in dictatorship and the market generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough. We test the theoretical implications by implementing a competitive vote market in the laboratory using a continuous open-book multi-unit double auction.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- August 2010.
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