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Insurance, Self-Protection, and the Economics of Terrorism / Darius Lakdawalla, George Zanjani.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Lakdawalla, Darius.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w9215.
- NBER working paper series no. w9215
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2002.
- Summary:
- This paper investigates the rationale for government intervention in the market for terrorism insurance, focusing on the externalities associated with self-protection. Self-protection by one target encourages terrorists to substitute towards less fortified targets. Investments in self- protection thus have negative external effects in the presence of rational terrorists. Government subsidies for terror insurance can discourage self-protection and limit the inefficiencies associated with these and other types of negative externalities. They may also serve as a complement to a policy of publicly provided protection.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- September 2002.
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