1 option
Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-off / Charles M. Cameron, John M. de Figueiredo, David E. Lewis.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Cameron, Charles M.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w22966.
- NBER working paper series no. w22966
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Other Title:
- Public Sector Personnel Economics
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.
- Summary:
- We model personnel policies in public agencies, examining how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and develop policy projects. However, doing so requires internal personnel policies that sort "slackers" from "zealots." Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector, and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Finally, even with well-designed personnel policies, there remains an inescapable trade-off between political control and expertise acquisition.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- December 2016.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.