Political Dynasties / Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó, Jason Snyder.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Dal Bó, Ernesto.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Dal Bó, Pedro.

Snyder, Jason.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w13122.

NBER working paper series no. w13122

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007.

Summary:

We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets power.

Notes:

Print version record

May 2007.