Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization / Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Grossman, Gene M.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Helpman, Elhanan.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w7303.

NBER working paper series no. w7303

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1999.

Summary:

We develop an equilibrium model of industrial structure in which the organization of firms is endogenous. Differentiated consumer products can be produced either by vertically integrated firms or by pairs of specialized companies. Production of each variety of consumer good requires a unique, specialized component. Vertically integrated firms can manufacture the components they need in the quantity and type that maximizes profits, but they face a relatively high cost of governance. Specialized firms can produce at lower cost, but input suppliers face a potential hold-up problem. We study the equilibrium mode of organization when inputs are fully or partially specialized. We consider how the degree of competition in the market and other parameters affect the equilibrium choices, and how the equilibrium compares with the efficient allocation.

Notes:

Print version record

August 1999.