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On the Desirability of Fiscal Constraints in a Monetary Union / V.V. Chari, Patrick J. Kehoe.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Chari, V.V.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w10232.
- NBER working paper series no. w10232
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004.
- Summary:
- The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to follow its policies. If it can commit, then debt constraints can only impose costs. If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable. This type of free-rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- January 2004.
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