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Coalition-Proof Trade and the Friedman Rule in the Lagos-Wright Model / Tai-wei Hu, John Kennan, Neil Wallace.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Hu, Tai-wei.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w13310.
- NBER working paper series no. w13310
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007.
- Summary:
- The Lagos-Wright model -- a monetary model in which pairwise meetings alternate in time with a centralized meeting -- has been extensively analyzed, but always using particular trading protocols. Here, trading protocols are replaced by two alternative notions of implementability: one that allows only individual defections and one that also allows cooperative defections in meetings. It is shown that the first-best allocation is implementable under the stricter notion with- out taxation if people are sufficiently patient. And, if people are free to skip the centralized meeting, then lump-sum taxation used to pay interest on money does not enlarge the set of implementable allocations.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- August 2007.
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