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A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation / Steven Shavell.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Shavell, Steven.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w20747.
- NBER working paper series no. w20747
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2014.
- Summary:
- The deterrence of crime and its reduction through incapacitation are studied in a simple multiperiod model of crime and law enforcement. Optimal imprisonment sanctions and the optimal probability of sanctions are determined. A point of emphasis is that the incapacitation of individuals is often socially desirable even when they are potentially deterrable. The reason is that successful deterrence may require a relatively high probability of sanctions and thus a relatively high enforcement expense. In contrast, incapacitation may yield benefits no matter how low the probability of sanctions is--implying that incapacitation may be superior to deterrence.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- December 2014.
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