Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Reforms with Majority Voting / Pravin Krishna, Devashish Mitra.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Krishna, Pravin.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Mitra, Devashish.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w10826.

NBER working paper series no. w10826

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004.

Summary:

This paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country. When trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries, we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria - countries may both be protectionist or trade freely with each other. Starting with trade protection in both countries, a unilateral reform in one country is thus shown to bring about a free trade equilibrium (a self-enforcing state) that is consistent with majority voting in both countries.

Notes:

Print version record

October 2004.