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Identification and Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information / Patrick Bajari, Han Hong, Stephen Ryan.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Bajari, Patrick.
- Series:
- Technical Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. t0301.
- NBER technical working paper series no. t0301
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004.
- Summary:
- We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute all of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose simulation-based estimators for static, discrete games. With appropriate exclusion restrictions about how covariates enter into payoffs and influence equilibrium selection, the model is identified with only weak parametric assumptions. Monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately-sized samples. As an application, we study the strategic decision of firms in spatially-separated markets to establish a presence on the Internet.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- October 2004.
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