Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points? / Emmanuel Saez.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Saez, Emmanuel.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w7366.

NBER working paper series no. w7366

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1999.

Summary:

This paper investigates whether taxpayers bunch at the kink points of the US income tax schedule (i.e. where marginal rates jump) using tax returns data. Clear evidence of bunching is found only at the first kink point (where marginal rates jump from 0 to 15%). Evidence for other kink points is weak or null. Evidence of bunching is stronger for itemizers than for non-itemizers. Theoretical models of behavioral responses to taxation show that bunching is proportional to the compensated elasticity of income with respect to tax rates. These models are used to perform simulations of bunching and calibrate the key parameters (the behavioral elasticity and the extent to which taxpayers control their income) to the empirical income distributions. Except for low income earners, the behavioral elasticity consistent with the empirical results is small.

Notes:

Print version record

September 1999.