How Do Legal Differences and Learning Affect Financial Contracts? / Steven N. Kaplan, Frederic Martel, Per Stromberg.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kaplan, Steven N.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Martel, Frederic.

Stromberg, Per.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w10097.

NBER working paper series no. w10097

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2003.

Summary:

We analyze venture capital (VC) investments in twenty-three non-U.S. countries and compare them to VC investments in the U.S. We describe how the contracts allocate cash flow, board, liquidation, and other control rights. In univariate analyses, contracts differ across legal regimes. At the same time, however, more experienced VCs implement U.S.-style contracts regardless of legal regime. In most specifications, legal regime becomes insignificant controlling for VC sophistication. VCs who use U.S.-style contracts fail significantly less often. Financial contracting theories in the presence of fixed costs of learning, therefore, appear to explain contracts along a wide range of legal regimes.

Notes:

Print version record

November 2003.