Antidumping and Retaliation Threats / Bruce A. Blonigen, Chad P. Bown.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Blonigen, Bruce A.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Bown, Chad P.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w8576.

NBER working paper series no. w8576

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2001.

Summary:

This paper examines how the prospect of foreign retaliation affects the antidumping (AD) process in the United States. We separate the capacity for retaliation into two channels: (i) the capacity for foreign government retaliation under the dispute settlement procedures of the GATT/WTO system, and (ii) the capacity for foreign industry retaliation through reciprocal claims of dumping and the foreign pursuit of AD duties in countries with AD regimes. Using a nested logit framework and analyzing U.S. AD cases between 1980 and 1998, we find significant empirical evidence consistent with the theory that U.S. industry is influenced by the threat of reciprocal foreign ADDs in its decision of which foreign countries to name in the initial AD petition, and that the U.S. AD authority's antidumping decisions are influenced by the threat of foreign retaliation under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism.

Notes:

Print version record

November 2001.