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The Bidder's Curse / Young Han Lee, Ulrike Malmendier.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Lee, Young Han.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w13699.
- NBER working paper series no. w13699
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007.
- Summary:
- We employ a novel approach to identify overbidding in the field. We compare auction prices to fixed prices for the same item on the same webpage. In detailed board-game data, 42 percent of auctions exceed the simultaneous fixed price. The result replicates in a broad cross-section of auctions (48 percent). A small fraction of overbidders, 17 percent, suffices to generate the overbidding. The observed behavior is inconsistent with rational behavior, even allowing for uncertainty and switching costs, since also the expected auction price exceeds the fixed price. Limited attention to outside options is most consistent with our results.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- December 2007.
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