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Human Capital, Bankruptcy and Capital Structure / Jonathan B. Berk, Richard Stanton, Josef Zechner.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Berk, Jonathan B.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w13014.
- NBER working paper series no. w13014
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007.
- Summary:
- We derive a firm's optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk, while equity holders can diversify this risk away. In the presence of corporate taxes, our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice. It also makes a number of predictions for the cross-sectional distribution of firm leverage. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, it implies persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms. An important new empirical prediction of the model is that, ceteris paribus, firms with more leverage should pay higher wages.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- April 2007.
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