Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy with Near Rational Expectations / Michael Woodford.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Woodford, Michael.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w11896.

NBER working paper series no. w11896

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005.

Summary:

The paper considers optimal monetary stabilization policy in a forward-looking model, when the central bank recognizes that private-sector expectations need not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs that are close enough to model-consistency. The proposed method offers a way of avoiding the assumption that the central bank can count on private-sector expectations coinciding precisely with whatever it plans to do, while at the same time also avoiding the equally unpalatable assumption that the central bank can precisely model private-sector learning and optimize in reliance upon a precise law of motion for expectations.

The main qualitative conclusions of the rational-expectations analysis of optimal policy carry over to the weaker assumption of near-rational expectations. It is found that commitment continues to be important for optimal policy, that the optimal long-run inflation target is unaffected by the degree of potential distortion of beliefs, and that optimal policy is even more history-dependent than if rational expectations are assumed.

Notes:

Print version record

December 2005.