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Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets / Soohyung Lee, Muriel Niederle, Hye-Rim Kim, Woo-Keum Kim.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Lee, Soohyung.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w17340.
- NBER working paper series no. w17340
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2011.
- Summary:
- The large literature on costly signaling and the somewhat scant literature on preference signaling had varying success in showing the effectiveness of signals. We use a field experiment to show that even when everyone can send a signal, signals are free and the only costs are opportunity costs, sending a signal increases the chances of success. In an online dating experiment, participants can attach "virtual roses" to a proposal to signal special interest in another participant. We find that attaching a rose to an offer substantially increases the chance of acceptance. This effect is driven by an increase in the acceptance rate when the offer is made to a participant who is less desirable than the proposer. Furthermore, participants endowed with more roses have more of their offers accepted than their counterparts.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- August 2011.
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