Elected Versus Appointed Policymakers: Evidence from City Treasurers / Alexander Whalley.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Whalley, Alexander.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w15643.

NBER working paper series no. w15643

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Elected Versus Appointed Policymakers

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2010.

Summary:

This paper investigates whether methods of public official selection affect policymaking in cities. I draw on the unique characteristics of California's city referendum process to identify the causal effect of city treasurers' method of selection on their cities' debt management policies. I utilize a regression discontinuity strategy based on the effect of narrowly-passing appointive city treasurer referendums on city borrowing costs. The results indicate that appointive treasurers reduce a city's cost of borrowing by 13% to 23%. The results imply that if all cities in California with elected treasurers were to appoint them, total borrowing expenditures would be reduced by more than $20 million per year. Appointive city treasurers appear to reduce borrowing costs primarily through the refinancing of expensive debt at lower interest rates.

Notes:

Print version record

January 2010.