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Bayesian Persuasion / Emir Kamenica, Matthew Gentzkow.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Kamenica, Emir.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w15540.
- NBER working paper series no. w15540
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009.
- Summary:
- When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a persuasion mechanism that strictly benefits Sender. We characterize the optimal mechanism. Finally, we analyze several examples that illustrate the applicability of our results.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- November 2009.
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